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APPLYING BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS TO TAX COMPLIANCE: 
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM LATVIA1 
 





In recent years, tax authorities around the world have started to use behavioral insights to 
encourage taxpayers to fulfill their obligations. We review and discuss some of the recent 
empirical literature on tax compliance. In line with recent trends, we report on a field 
experiment in collaboration with the State Revenue Service of Latvia (SRS) to encourage 
previously non-compliant individuals, who also have their own business income, to submit 
their tax declarations on time in 2017. These individuals were pre-emptively sent emails with 
behaviorally informed messages in order to reach and influence an important target population 
at a salient moment. Our results indicate that all of the behaviorally-informed messages 
increased submissions by the submission deadline when compared to a control group. The best 
performer was a message that specifically framed non-compliant behavior as a deliberate 
choice and increased timely submissions by 9.4% (4.1 percentage points; p=0.05).  
 
JEL Classification Codes: C93, H26 





In recent years, behavioral economics, the practice of melding psychological and analogous 
insights within standard economic models, has been applied in a wide variety of policy arenas. 
An overlap in interest between governments, who are often attracted by the idea of relatively 
low-cost interventions, and researchers, who have been inspired by encouraging results from 
increasingly ambitious field experiments, has led to a growing body of empirical evidence, and 
to the establishment of national and sub-national “nudge” units. One context that has proven 
particularly fruitful from both perspectives is tax compliance which has, in turn, received 
substantial attention and resulted in a number of successes. 
 
Recent studies have explored a wide variety of psychological tactics to increase tax 
compliance. These have either included deterrence messages aimed at addressing 
misperceptions of the various parameters of the classic incentive-based model of Allingham 
and Sandmo (1972), or have included notions of benefits from taxation, fairness and social 
norms, morality, and other topics, sometimes broadly classified as “tax morale” (Luttmer & 
Singhal, 2014), or addressed using the term “moral suasion” (Mascagni, 2018; Torgler, 2004b), 
and often described as targeting non-pecuniary and intrinsic motivations. 
 
1 The paper is a product of the Mind, Behavior, and Development (eMBeD) unit, Development Economics 
Department of the World Bank. Emails: jjamison@worldbank.org, nmazar@bu.edu, isen@worldbank.org. We 
thank the State Revenue Service of Latvia for their tremendous cooperation throughout this project, as well as 
Mihails Hazans, Ania Jaroszewicz, Emily Sinnott and Varun Gauri for their support. This paper solely represents 
the views of the authors and not (necessarily) the Government of Latvia or the World Bank Group. 
2 Mind, Behavior, and Development Unit (eMBeD), The World Bank. 
3 Economics Department, University of Exeter. 
4 Questrom School of Business, Boston University. 
Journal of Tax Administration Vol 6:2 2021   Applying Behavioral Insights To Tax Compliance  
7 
 
However, the results from these studies have been mixed, highlighting the centrality of the 
interaction between messages and specific environments, including the baseline characteristics 
and perceptions of taxpayers, and the type of tax (e.g., individual or business tax, income, or 
other). In this paper, we first present a short review of the increasing body of evidence from 
tax compliance experiments to take stock of the most recent literature and findings. We 
organize the literature first by the different types of messages used, which are broadly classified 
as deterrence and non-deterrence messages. We subsequently mention other types of 
behaviorally informed interventions, such as rewards and other incentives, varying 
communications channels, and more. We highlight sources of heterogeneity wherever relevant, 
including the type of tax in question, target groups, timing of interventions, communication 
channels, and outcomes. We find that, overall, deterrence messages that change the perceived 
probability of audit or make the penalties for non-compliance salient worked in a number of 
different field experiments, although there were some exceptions. When considering other 
types of messages, we find that messages highlighting the tax behavior of others (i.e., social 
norms) and omission/commission messages that increase the moral costs of non-compliance 
have worked towards increasing compliance for income taxes.  
 
Next, we study tax compliance behavior in a country where tax revenue is substantially 
subverted by the presence of a large shadow economy, namely Latvia. The shadow economy 
in Latvia is estimated to be close to a quarter of the official gross domestic product (GDP) 
level, compared with an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
average of only 14 percent. This includes both underreported wages from formal employment 
and underreported income from individuals who are self-employed.  
 
We present results from an experiment in conjunction with the tax authority in Latvia, where 
behaviorally-informed messages were sent to self-employed individuals who had failed to 
submit their tax declaration or had submitted it late in any of the previous three years. We show 
that, in the Latvian context, an omission/commission message framing non-compliant behavior 
as a deliberate choice improved subsequent compliance by 9.4% (4.1 percentage points; 
p=0.05) more than a social norms message for tax declarations and showed a significant 
improvement when compared to the control group. With regards to late compliance, the social 
norms message had generated the most tax declaration submissions a month and a half after 
the deadline, 5.1% more (or 3.2 percentage points) than the control group. Both of these 
impacts become stronger when we introduced controls for other important drivers of 
compliance, such as demographics, and past income and tax payment behavior. We found that 
a third simple reminder message had no impact. 
 
We expect the paper to be useful in several ways. First, it incorporates a brief and up-to-date 
summary of the large number of behaviorally-informed tax compliance interventions 
completed. Second, the paper presents the results of a pre-emptive intervention experiment 
targeted at a group of individuals central to the shadow economies of Eastern Europe: partially 
or fully self-employed individuals who have previously delayed in declaring or failed to declare 
tax obligations. As such, our paper also increases understanding about how to reduce shadow 
economies. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, no previous behavioral tax compliance 
interventions of any kind have been carried out in Latvia (or any highly similar country in the 
same geographical area and with a large shadow economy).  Third, we add evidence in respect 
of several of the most consistently promising types of behavioral messages used in previous 
field experiments by directly comparing their relative efficacies.  
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the current literature on behavioral 
interventions related to tax compliance. Section 3 introduces the context of our experiment, 
including the collaboration with Latvian tax authorities, and the experiment’s formal design 
and data. Section 4 presents the main results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. A SHORT REVIEW OF THE BEHAVIORAL TAX LITERATURE 
 
Recently, researchers have started working alongside tax authorities to test different insights 
drawn from behavioral science through randomized control trials and other quasi impact 
evaluation methods at scale (Pomeranz & Vila-Belda, 2018). While, traditionally, most of this 
work has been in higher income countries, new studies and evidence are emerging from middle 
and lower income countries. According to Hallsworth (2014), the number of field experiments 
in taxation doubled between 2012 and 2014.  
 
Recent trials have both exhaustively tested the parameters and predictions of the traditional 
deterrence model and explored several different components that comprise “tax morale” in an 
attempt to explain the high levels of compliance observed in practice. Recent experiments have 
also become more ambitious in scale, trying to reach as many taxpayers as possible. The tax 
system in the country, the type of tax in question, the underlying characteristics and perceptions 
of taxpayers, social and cultural attitudes, and the baseline behaviors of taxpayers all appear to 
be relevant sources of heterogeneity.  In particular, a lot of the literature finds that individuals 
with different levels and sources of income, and firms, act differently. While most experiments 
target delinquent taxpayers who have missed payment deadlines, some target those who have 
forgotten to declare their tax obligations in the first place. Outcomes therefore typically include 
reported income, payments made, and payment amounts within a certain time frame after the 
intervention. The experiments reported below were also cost-effective, primarily using letters 
but also using emails and text messages to communicate messages and administrative data to 
both target individuals and firms, and to measure outcomes.  
 
At least three recent review papers (Hallsworth, 2014; Mascagni, 2018; Slemrod, 2017) are 
excellent sources that survey and interpret a lot of the recent experimental tax literature in 
depth5. These reviews are also wide in scope, discussing the broader tax literature and 
examining some of the experiments in great detail. Pomeranz and Vila-Belda (2018) also 
include an updated review of the tax literature in the context of recent collaborations between 
tax authorities and researchers. Hashimzade et al. (2013) is an excellent source for the 
theoretical background of the tax compliance literature. Arcos Holzinger and Biddle (2016) 
include an in-depth discussion of the theory, evidence, and related psychological insights. In 
this review, we attempt to arrange the evidence, focusing primarily on the psychological 
insights that were used to design the interventions, and cite an updated list of related field 
experiments. Using this method of categorization helps to put the focus squarely on the 
underlying beliefs, perceptions, and norms that, if changed, may subsequently result in a 
change in tax compliance behavior. We broadly divide the messages used in interventions into 
deterrence and non-deterrence categories, before discussing other kinds of behaviorally 
informed interventions. There are two important caveats: first, we do not claim that this review 
is comprehensive, and second, we do not comment on the size of the impacts. Therefore, this 
is a much shorter, more focused, and more abbreviated review of the important recent literature 
on behavioral insights towards improving tax compliance.  
 
5 Hallsworth (2014) also contains an excellent and easy to follow summary table of the major field experiments 
and results. 
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2.1 Deterrence Messages 
 
2.1.A Perceptions of audit probability 
 
Because individuals tend to overweight low probabilities, interventions that inform taxpayers 
about the true probability of an audit can be effective, even when this is quite low (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979). However, creating an ambiguous audit environment with unknown or 
irregular audit probabilities may also be effective at increasing compliance (Dai et al., 2015). 
Recent field experiments have extensively tested how changing these perceptions and making 
them more salient can affect tax compliance. In general, messages that increase the perception 
of audit probability appear to be effective. However, compliance does not typically increase 
with increasing probability, and there is a risk of heterogenous effects with poorer compliance 
for higher income individuals and firms in some cases.  
 
For example, Slemrod et al. (2001) find that, in the U.S., increased perceptions of audit 
increased reported income for lower and middle income taxpayers who, in general, had greater 
opportunities to evade on self-reported income, rents, and royalties. Hasseldine et al. (2007) 
show that deterrence letters improved compliance for sole proprietors in the U.K. who had 
reported income below a certain threshold for two consecutive years and, in particular, for those 
submitting self-prepared returns. Kleven et al. (2011) show that, in Denmark, income tax 
compliance differed based on the individual’s past audit experience and increased with 
increasing probability of audit. For example, the treatment group that was to be audited with 
certainty had significantly larger effects (almost double) than the treatment group with a 50% 
audit probability. They also show that options to evade matter, with compliance at almost 100% 
with the presence of third-party reporting but lower for those who self-reported income. In 
Finland, high and low probability audit letters sent to small, labor-intensive businesses 
increased VAT reporting for the high probability group (Harju et al., 2014). Similarly, other 
studies (including Dwenger et al., 2016, which examined a local church tax in Germany) find 
that making the probability of audit salient increases compliance, although compliance does 
not increase with increasing audit probability. In a large scale experiment in Uruguay, Bérgolo 
et al. (2017) found that providing firms with detailed information about past audit statistics, 
and average audit probability and penalties, together with a letter stating that evasion increases 
chances of audit, increased compliance, with the latter treatment performing marginally better. 
However, they not only found that higher audit probabilities (or penalties) do not lead to higher 
payments, but that firms’ beliefs of audit probabilities drop after receiving the treatment letters. 
The authors hypothesize that even though firms respond to the threat of audit, it is not through 
the rational mechanisms laid out in Allingham and Sandmo (1972). 
 
Along with the differential effects outlined above, the evidence also suggests that being able to 
implement the stated probabilities of audit (compared to nudged perceptions) may be important 
(Carrillo, Pomeranz, et al., 2017; Mascagni, 2018). Deterrence messages may also backfire in 
some cases, leading to a reduction in compliance levels. In some cases, compliance or reported 
income fell for high income individuals and firms (Ariel, 2012; Gangl et al., 2014; Slemrod et 
al., 2001). For example, in Gangl et al. (2014), the authors hypothesize that the reduction in 
compliance for firms in Austria is due to the crowding out of taxpayers’ intrinsic motivation to 
comply. 
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2.1.B Perceptions of tax evasion costs 
 
Research has shown that individuals may underestimate and/or be inattentive to financial 
penalties (Karlan et al., 2016; Stango & Zinman, 2011). Thus, vividly highlighting the 
financial, temporal, and effort costs of being caught seems to be an effective way of increasing 
tax compliance (see the lab experiments in Blackwell, 2007).  Recent field experiments that 
have made penalties salient have also shown promising results in terms of increasing 
compliance. 
 
For example, in a large scale field experiment in Argentina, a deterrence letter relating to 
property taxes that provided a simple example of the different costs that would arise from 
unpaid taxes after a year increased compliance (Castro and Scartascini, 2015). Perez-Truglia  
and Troiano (2018) made salient penalties to delinquent individuals in the U.S., resulting in an 
increase in payments. 
 
2.1.C Other deterrence messages 
 
A third parameter affecting compliance in Allingham and Sandmo (1972) is the tax rate. Harju 
et al. (2014) studied the impact of exogenously varying the VAT rate and found that a higher 
tax rate led to lower compliance rates for hairdressers in Finland. 
 
Another way of reframing audit probabilities that has proven to be relatively successful is to 
make detection by authorities more salient. Oftentimes, this information is obtained from third-
party reporting (see Pomeranz and Vila-Belda, 2018, for further details). For example, Fellner 
et al. (2013) carried out a field experiment in Austria with potential TV license fee evaders. 
They found that employing a letter treatment emphasizing that the risk of detection was high, 
and highlighting the associated financial and legal penalties involved had a strong effect on 
compliance. In an experiment conducted in Norway which aimed to increase reporting by 
individuals on foreign income, the addition of a sentence noting that the tax administration had 
detected assets abroad in previous years to communications led to more individuals reporting 
foreign income (Bott et al., 2017). Similarly, a letter sent to firms in Chile notifying them that 
they were being monitored and may be audited led to increased VAT payments (Pomeranz, 
2015). In an experiment with delinquent firms in Costa Rica, Brockmeyer et al. (2016) found 
that a set of deterrence messages, including the threat of detection as a result of third-party 
information, had strong effects on compliance.   
 
2.2 Non-Deterrence Messages 
 
2.2.A Perceptions of public benefits from compliance 
 
Utilizing a set of messages that highlight the benefits of compliance (i.e., how taxes are used 
and how this benefits society) may increase tax compliance. The simple idea behind such fiscal 
exchange literature is that citizens can be motivated to pay revenue (taxes) for the services 
provided by government. This can happen through a variety of means: intrinsically motivating 
taxpayers to reciprocate because they appreciate the services provided; increasing the moral 
costs of non-compliance; invoking feelings of empowerment or agency when individuals can 
allocate expenditure; and improving transparency and trust in order to improve taxpayers’ 
relationships with the state. Overall, utilizing these types of messages has produced mixed 
results.  
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For a successful example, see Bott et al. (2017), which details a field experiment in Norway 
where there was increased reporting of foreign income by individuals when the letter they 
received highlighted that taxes are used for publicly financed services. Similarly, Hallsworth 
(2014) found that messages with both positive and negative framing of gains and losses, 
respectively, from (not) funding public services in the U.K. increased compliance. An 
experiment in Argentina showed that the impact of the actual provision of a public good, a 
sidewalk by a municipality, had persistent effects on compliance for winners (randomly chosen 
from those who complied) along with spillover effects on neighbors (Carrillo, Castro et al., 
2017). In the Rwandan context, Mascagni, Nell and Monkam (2017) found that a public service 
message (delivered via SMS, and emphasizing how taxes help to provide education, healthcare, 
and safety for citizens) was the most effective at improving compliance, even in a low income 
setting.  
 
However, there are also several instances where such messages have been less effective. For 
example, Castro and Scartascini (2015) found no effect in the context of property taxes in 
Argentina when utilizing a letter that provided information on the use of revenues by the 
municipality. Blumenthal et al. (2001) studied the impact of letters to taxpayers that both 
highlighted how taxes in Minnesota (U.S.) are spent and encouraged support for these services, 
and found that they had no effect on compliance. Bérgolo et al. (2017) also found that a public 
goods message in a letter sent to firms in Uruguay had no effect on compliance. In addition, 
Torgler (2004b) found that letters sent in Switzerland that explained the role that taxes and 
compliance play in maintaining active citizen participation and democratic structures had no 
effect on compliance rates. Ariel (2012) found that when firms were given information about 
how public money is spent and the social implications of non-compliance, it actually reduced 
compliance rates.  
 
Can enabling taxpayers to play a more active role in the process (for example, by allowing 
them to specify their spending priorities) increase compliance rates? In a hypothetical lab 
setting in the U.S, Lamberton et al. (2014) found that compliance increased when taxpayers 
were given increased agency and provided with a feedback channel. An earlier lab study in 
Costa Rica and Switzerland (Torgler, 2004a) produced similar findings, but no field experiment 
evidence currently exists.  
 
2.2.B Perceptions of government 
 
Perceptions of, or attitudes towards, the effectiveness of government itself can influence 
compliance. While most studies here are descriptive, we still think it is important to take this 
into consideration when thinking about compliance.  
 
Frey and Torgler (2007) showed that perceptions of tax evasion, along with institutional 
measures (such as voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rules of law, and control of corruption) are 
correlated with tax morale. In a comparative study in Botswana and South Africa, Cummings 
et al. (2009) found that perceptions of the quality of governance, perceived through fairness of 
the tax administration, fiscal exchange, and overall attitudes may explain compliance. In an 
interesting modification, Kettle et al. (2016) found that invoking national pride increases 
compliance in Guatemala. Besley et al.  (2015) showed how an unpopular and “unfair” tax in 
the U.K. had persistent effects on compliance long after its removal, making a key empirical 
contribution to the theoretical literature on fairness and compliance (see, for example, the 
discussion of distributive, procedural, and retributive justice in Kirchler, 2007). 
Journal of Tax Administration Vol 6:2 2021   Applying Behavioral Insights To Tax Compliance  
12 
 
2.2.C Social norms 
 
Previous studies have shown that people are “conditional cooperators” in the lab, increasing 
their contributions in public goods games if others are also contributing, but withdrawing 
otherwise (Charness & Rabin, 2002; Fehr & Falk, 2002). Several studies have shown that these 
preferences also hold true in the domain of tax compliance, in that any individual taxpayer will 
be less inclined to pay her taxes if she believes that others are not cooperating—that is, if she 
believes that others are not paying their fair share of taxes (Bazart & Bonein, 2014; Frey & 
Torgler, 2007). Therefore, what others do (descriptive expectations) and believe (injunctive or 
normative expectations) affect an individual’s behavior (Bicchieri et al., 2014; World Bank, 
2015). Descriptive norms typically highlight how many other individuals or firms are 
complying, which is also indicative of normative support for the behavior. The decision to 
comply may also be influenced by moral costs of unfairness and inequity when others are 
complying, and the literature sometimes categorizes such interventions as fairness 
interventions. We find that, in general, social norms messages have been more successful in 
the context of income tax compliance than for other kinds of taxes. The success of social norms 
messages may depend on the beliefs that taxpayers already hold about compliance (Hallsworth, 
2014).  
 
In their seminal experimental study, Hallsworth et al. (2017) found that highlighting descriptive 
norms relating to tax payment may be one of the more effective ways of encouraging tax 
compliance in the U.K., and that it is more effective than highlighting injunctive norms. A 
follow-up experiment indicated that highlighting more specific norms—e.g., norms pertaining 
to an individual’s geographic location or financial situation—may be even more successful. In 
a previous study in the U.S., Coleman (1996) also found descriptive norms messages to be 
effective. In a more recent experiment, Kettle et al. (2016) found a message highlighting 
descriptive norms to be one of the two most successful messages for increasing compliance in 
Guatemala. The experiment showed that highlighting descriptive norms that were not 
necessarily high (64.5%) still had a positive impact on compliance, for both individuals and 
firms. Similarly, Del Carpio (2014) found that informing individuals about descriptive norms 
for property tax payments increased compliance in Peru, after finding that these tax payments 
were underestimated at the baseline.  
 
In some instances, social norms messages have not worked. Hernandez et al. (2017) even found 
that they had a negative effect in the context of personal income tax in Poland. In addition, 
Castro and Scartascini (2015) found that a message about descriptive social norms had no effect 
in the context of property taxes in Argentina. Similarly, Dwenger et al. (2016) found that social 
norms messages had no impact in the context of the church tax in Germany, Fellner et al. (2013) 
found generally weak evidence that they affected compliance rates in the context of TV license 
fees in Austria, and John and Blume (2018) found that they led to lower compliance rates in 




Another “moral suasion” message that has been shown to improve compliance is appealing to 
an individual’s personal sense of duty, or personal norms. For example, recent experiments 
have shown that letters that frame non-compliance as an intentional and deliberate choice 
typically do well in increasing compliance. This may be because the impending losses from 
acting can hurt more than gains from compliance (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Put another 
way, moral violations appear to be less serious when resulting from inaction (Descioliet al., 
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2012; Kettle et al., 2016; Mazar & Hawkins, 2015). In general, individuals are often less 
comfortable with unethical behavior when it is described as being an intentional action rather 
than a failure to take action (Ritov & Baron, 1990). Accordingly, in large scale field 
experiments, commission messages in Poland and Guatemala led to larger increases in 
compliance than other messages (Hernandez et al., 2017; Kettle et al., 2016). These messages 
are often “harder toned” and may also fit within the deterrence category of messages, as they 
may work by changing perceptions of audit probabilities.  
 
2.3 Social, Monetary, and Non-Monetary Rewards 
 
Beyond deterrence and moral appeals, can taxpayers be directly incentivized to comply? 
Behaviorally-informed interventions may work, primarily through extrinsic rather than 
intrinsic motivation, and can include social as well as monetary rewards. In an early lab 
experiment, Alm et al. (1992) concluded that rewards that are more immediate and salient (such 
as a lottery or fixed reward) work better than audit reductions or public goods. In general, 
lotteries, including tax lotteries, may work well, as individuals overweight small probabilities. 
Subsequent evidence from field experiments has been largely positive. 
 
For example, Dwenger et al. (2016) found interesting results in a field experiment examining 
a local church tax in Germany. They tested interventions that included a lottery, social 
recognition in a local newspaper, or both. The results were different for baseline compliers, 
who increased their contributions, particularly for interventions that included social 
recognition, and evaders who decreased their contributions. Similarly, Koessler et al. (2016) 
found non-monetary rewards (such as a weekend getaway) to be more effective than monetary 
rewards in Switzerland. Carrillo, Castro et al. (2017) found that being given the opportunity to 
win the municipality lottery in Argentina increased compliance but this was persistent only 
when a durable good (i.e., the sidewalk) was provided. However, Dunning et al. (2016) found 
that providing compliant taxpayers in Uruguay with a tax holiday led to a decrease in 
compliance after the tax holiday had taken place. 
 
Tax authorities around the world also use social shaming as a tool to increase compliance. They 
usually do this by publishing lists of delinquent taxpayers online.  Field experiments examining 
social shaming interventions have found that results here are often sensitive to baseline levels 
of compliance. 
 
In a lower income context, in Bangladesh, Chetty et al. (2014) showed that sharing information 
about firms’ compliance with peers increased VAT payments for firms in clusters where at 
least 15% of firms were complying at the baseline. The intervention meant that firms knew that 
their tax compliance information would be shared with other firms in the cluster. In a more 
directed shaming experiment in the U.S., Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2018) randomly informed 
neighbors about delinquent taxpayers via an online list and found that this had significant 
effects on the first quartile of delinquents and those who owed less money. Brockmeyer et al. 
(2016) showed that an SMS message threatening to publish delinquent firms’ names online 
increased filings significantly.  
 
In the context of the sales tax at the end of the VAT chain, an alternative is to incentivize 
consumers to improve compliance by firms. This provides useful third-party information when 
the audit trail breaks down in the final sale from retailer to consumer (Pomeranz, 2015).  
Naritomi (2016) found that rewarding consumers in Brazil with tax rebates and lottery tickets 
increased compliance by retail firms.   
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2.4 Simplification, Information, Timing, and Delivery Channels 
 
As a first step, most field experiments include a simplification of the communication to 
taxpayers or the provision of basic information, as tax systems can be inherently complex and 
hard to navigate. Individuals in such tax systems may find it harder to predict their true levels 
of tax liability. In an early lab experiment, Alm et al. (2010) showed how providing taxpayers 
with information can increase both tax filings and income. The Cabinet Office Behavioural 
Insights Team (2012) highlight a few key lessons in designing such communications 
effectively, such as personalizing the language and highlighting the key actions to be taken. 
Hernandez et al. (2017) showed how simplified intervention letters improved compliance in 
Poland when compared to a conventionally worded letter sent to the control group.  Similarly, 
Dwenger et al. (2016) found that using simplified mailings increased contributions 
significantly in the context of a local church tax in Germany. Robitaille et al. (2020) found that, 
in Ontario, Canada, planning prompt interventions increased the chances that organizations 
would file their overdue taxes. In addition, while Robitaille et al.’s (2020) intervention did not 
appear to have effects that persisted across tax years, organizations did not habituate to the 
manipulation and its effects were consistent across repeated exposures. Bhargava and Manoli 
(2015) found that U.S. taxpayers who were eligible for the earned income tax credit (EITC) 
were most likely to respond to various  simplifications in mailings to increase filings. John and 
Blume (2018) found that simplification improves compliance in respect of council tax 
payments in London. 
 
In the Rwandan context, Mascagni et al. (2017) successfully used images along with messages 
about deterrence and fiscal exchange to provide better information. In the U.S., Guyton et al. 
(2017) found that sending postcards and brochures to individuals who had not filed their returns 
in recent years, and who were potentially eligible for the EITC, was effective. Discussing 
benefits and where to get further information helped individuals in the treatment groups to file 
more returns, both in order to claim withholdings and to make voluntary payments, although 
these effects did not persist over time 
 
Researchers conducting field experiments have varied the timings of communications with 
taxpayers based on their policy objectives. For example, if the objective is to increase the tax 
base in the context of high evasion and/or low tax to GDP ratios, letters are typically sent right 
before or during the reporting period to increase salience (Mascagni et al., 2017). However, if 
individuals often forget to, or do not, pay their tax liabilities after reporting has been completed, 
letters are sent soon after the payment deadline has passed (as in Hallsworth et al., 2017) 
 
Finally, the communication delivery channel can be important. For example, Ortega and 
Scartascini (2015) used a variety of channels when communicating with delinquent individuals 
in Columbia, sending letters, emails, and conducting in-person visits. They found that in-person 
visits had the greatest impact. Similarly, Dorrenberg and Schmitz (2017) found that delivering 
messages in person achieved better results than delivering them by letter for small firms in 
Slovenia. Mascagni et al. (2017) found that, overall, the SMS channel was more effective than 
letter or email in Kenya. However, Hernandez et al. (2017) did not find a difference in impact 
when delivering letters by regular and registered mail in Poland. 
  





Although it is clear that the overall literature on behavioral approaches to tax compliance is 
expansive, it is also the case that much remains unknown. As with most behavioral science 
interventions, the precise combination of tax type, target population (e.g., income level or firm 
versus individual), social and cultural norms, timing, framing of the message, and delivery 
channel etc. can greatly influence the magnitude or even the sign of the impact. Although the 
results of previous studies yield strong hints about what might work where, they are hardly 
dispositive, especially given the large number of possible permutations of inputs. However, in 
spite of the mixed results, we do see a few patterns starting to emerge. Deterrence messages 
have increased compliance in a number of different field experiments, but it is important to 
note the different sources of heterogeneity in these results. For other types of messages, we 
find that messages highlighting the tax behavior of others (i.e., social norms) and harder toned 
omission/commission messages seem to show promise in terms of improving income tax 
compliance. In the future, more quantitative meta-analysis could be conducted in order to better 
identify patterns, and assess the likelihood of different types of messages working in different 
contexts and across types of taxes. 
 
3. AN APPLICATION TO LATVIA: CONTEXT, DATA, AND DESIGN  
 
The informal shadow economy in Latvia is estimated to be approximately one quarter of the 
size of the country’s GDP, compared to an average of 14.4% across the OECD countries 
(Hazans, 2011; World Bank, 2017). Unsurprisingly, it has one of the lowest ratios of tax 
revenue to GDP of developed countries: at 29%, this is five percentage points below the OECD 
average and a full ten percentage points below the European Union average (World Bank, 
2017). Being able to increase tax revenues by even a small fraction of GDP would make a 
tremendous difference to the government’s ability to function well and provide services to its 
citizens.  
 
Spurred on by these facts, Latvia’s Ministry of Finance collaborated with the World Bank on 
a holistic review of the country’s tax system, with the intention of using this to help with the 
design of a new and improved tax strategy. As a complement to the comprehensive review, and 
inspired by the literature described above, the SRS (the Latvian tax authority) worked with the 
Mind, Behavior, and Development (eMBeD) unit at the World Bank on a pilot field experiment 
to use preemptive, behaviorally-informed messages to increase tax compliance.  
 
All eligible residents of Latvia are required to submit an Annual Income Declaration (AID) 
between March 1st and June 1st. The SRS determined that the most relevant target group for 
the field experiment to increase compliance would be those individuals who did not primarily 
receive regular salaried income and who had been delinquent previously. To that end, they 
identified all self-employed individuals who had either submitted their AID late or failed to 
submit it in one or more of the tax years 2013-2015.  
 
Tables 1 and 2 below provide more information about the study sample identified by the 
Latvian tax authority. Table 1 shows its demographic characteristics, as well as the revenue 
reported by the sample in the 2015 tax year and the proportion of income reported from 
business activity. The table shows that 58% of the group had delayed submitting their return 
the previous year (while the remaining members had delayed submitting in prior years) and, 
on average, their share of business income was nearly half of their total income, at 49%. 
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While these individuals are part of the tax system, they differ from the average individual 
taxpayer in at least two ways. First, these individuals had not submitted their returns by the 
deadline in at least one of the three previous years, and second, the delay in their submission 
was substantial, as shown in Table 2.  For example, in a sub-sample analysis of 1166 
individuals who had delayed submission in the past three years, the mean delay during that 
period was 144 days, with 20% failing to submit returns in the 2013 tax year and 15% in the 
2014 tax year. 
 
Table A1 (in the Appendix) shows the 25 strata of interest to the Latvian authorities. These 
strata may, primarily, have been of interest because the behaviors may have been different 
across these groups, although the study was not powered to detect differences across these 
groups. The main stratification variables of interest included age, revenue in the 2015 tax year, 
and dependence on business activity income.  
 
Table 1: Basic characteristics (entire sample) 
 
 Mean SD Min Max N 
Female      0.56      0.50      0.00      1.00 
     
4,324 
Age (years)     47.02     14.49 
    
19.00     98.00 
     
4,324 
Ever Married      0.74      0.44      0.00      1.00 
     
4,324 




25,855.67      5.35 978,902.76 
     
4,324 
Delay in submitting 
return last year 
(versus in previous 
years)      0.58      0.49      0.00      1.00 
     
4324 
Share of business 
income      0.49 0.38      0.00      1.00 




Table 2: Delay in submission of AID among the “high-risk” target sample (subsample) 
 
 Mean SD Min Max N 
taxationyear2013 
(days)    201.45    247.56      3.00    942.00      1166 
taxationyear2014 
(days)    148.63    152.96      3.00    578.00      1166 
taxationyear2015 
(days)     81.83     59.40      3.00    213.00      1166 
Delay days  
(over 3 years)    143.97    128.96      4.00    577.33      1166 
 
 
In total, 4,324 individuals pre-emptively (i.e., before any delinquency in 2017) and randomly 
received one of three treatment emails or were assigned to a control group that received no 
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message, resulting in 1,081 individuals per arm6. To the best of our knowledge, these emails 
were sent out right before the reporting period started on March 1st. 
 
We provide further motivation for the selected treatment messages below. Table A5 ( in the 
Appendix) shows the full text of the email messages sent. The first message (T1)—a simple 
reminder—was selected because the targeted individuals had shown habitual signs of delaying 
return submissions over the past few years. The message for T2 Omission/Commission was 
selected because similar messages had been the most effective in increasing compliance in a 
recent study in Guatemala (Kettle et al., 2016) and had also been effective in Poland 
(Hernandez et al., 2017). It also had a “harder” tone, than the messages in our other two 
interventions. Finally, the T3 Social Norm message was included because this message has 
been effective in a number of recent field experiments (although it had negative effect in 
Poland; see Hernandez et al., 2017), as discussed in Section 2. 
 
T1 Simple Reminder: Tax letters, or any other form of communication from the government, 
typically contain multiple pieces of key information that are often hidden within legal jargon. 
The first step when revising any communication is to simplify it, by personalizing the message, 
and using clear, directed language. Consequently, this email reminded individuals of the tax 
timeline and included a link to the online system as well as contact information in case of 
questions. It was signed off with the name of the Chief Tax Inspector to make it more personal, 
as the names of the recipients could not be included for technical reasons. In summary, it 
contained three short, easy-to-read sentences, without extraneous information. 
 
T2 Omission / Commission:  In addition to the text from T1, this email stated that previously 
missed deadlines had been considered to be unintentional and inadvertent (i.e., honest 
omissions). However, going forward, failures would be considered to be deliberate acts of non-
compliance (i.e., commissions). Framing non-compliant behavior as a deliberate choice 
reduces ambiguity about inaction, increases moral obligations towards action, and likely 
increases perceived deterrence.  
 
T3 Social Norms: Along with the text of T1, this email highlighted the descriptive social norm 
that an increasing number of taxpayers file their AID by the deadline each year. This draws on 
the insight that people tend to follow others, in part due to normative inferences about what 
others believe is the right thing to do. While social norms messaging typically includes a 
specific descriptive statistic relating to compliance, specific statistics were unavailable, so we 




The primary outcome measure of the experiment was AID submission by the deadline (June 
1st)7. Table A2 (in the Appendix) shows the balance tests. Age, past tax submission behavior, 
past revenue, and dependence on business activity were balanced by design. There is some 
imbalance with regard to gender and marital status, and we control for this in the regressions 
(Columns 2 and 4 in Table 3 below). To the best of our knowledge and understanding from 
conversations with SRS, all emails were sent out, and they received call backs from some 
 
6 Initial sample size calculations for detecting a 0.1 SD decrease in submission delay required about 1,550 
individuals per treatment arm, so the study was underpowered. 
7 The final sample size is 4,320. We dropped four individuals who had paid before the start of the payment period 
(i.e., March 1st). 
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recipients on specific phone numbers listed in the emails. We were, however, unable to 
ascertain whether the recipients of the emails had opened and read them.  
 
43.6% of the control target population had submitted their declarations by the deadline. AID 
submission in every treatment group was higher than in the control group (see Figure 1 below). 
Table 3 shows OLS results for simplicity of interpretation (see Table 3A in the Appendix for 
the logistic regression results). Submissions in the T1 (reminder) and T3 (social norms) groups 
were 5.5% (i.e., 2.4 percentage point) and 4.8% (2.1 percentage points higher respectively than 
the control group yet they were not statistically different from it. Submissions in T2 
(commission) were 9.4% (4.1 percentage points) higher than the control group—a statistically 
significant difference (p=0.05). These results become stronger when controlling for basic 
demographic information, and past income and tax compliance behavior, and the treatment 
effect in T2 (commission) was 4.2 percentage points higher than the control group, as shown 
in Column 2 of Table 3.  
 





In addition, 63% of the control group had submitted declarations by July 17th (46 days or 1.5 
months after the deadline), the last date for which we have data. Figure A1 shows the monthly 
submissions across the treatment arms for the entire period for which we have data. 
Submissions made by mid-July were highest in the social norms group, yet this was not 
statistically significant: 5% (3.2 percent points) higher than the control (also shown in Table 3, 
Column 3). However, when we controlled again for basic demographics, and past income and 











T1 Simple Reminder T2 Commission T3 Social Norms Control
Submitted AID by deadline, percent 
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Table 3: Main OLS regression results 
 
 
Table 4 shows the number of days until submission and the correlation of various taxpayer 
characteristics with submissions of the AID. Those who had delayed submission in the previous 
year (2015) were more likely to submit their returns by the deadline than those who had delayed 
submitting their AIDs in prior years. This highlights the importance of, when feasible, 
communicating earlier with taxpayers prevent them from habitually delaying submissions. 
Individuals who were female and had higher revenues in the 2015 tax year were also more 
likely to submit their AIDs by the deadline.  
 
We also investigated whether compliance by gender was differential across the treatment 
groups (shown in Table A4 in the Appendix), as women may have responded differently 
(Croson & Gneezy, 2009). While the study was not sufficiently powered to test for 
heterogeneity in treatment effects in subgroups, we still observed some interesting patterns. In 
particular, women were more likely to respond to the omission / commission and social norms 
messages (Columns 1 and 3), by 3.4 and 3.0 percentage points respectively when compared to 
the control group. Men were more likely to comply with the reminder message and omission / 
commission message (by 3.6 and 5 percentage points respectively; see Columns 2 and 4). This 
shows that the increased compliance in the omission / commission treatment arm was driven 
by both genders, but it also suggests that, in this setting, women were more likely to be 
persuaded by social norms messages.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Submitted by deadline Submitted by deadline Submitted Submitted 
          
T1: Simple Reminder 0.0238 0.0238 -0.00615 -0.00621 
 [0.0210] [0.0210] [0.0203] [0.0202] 
T2: Commission 0.0408* 0.0421** 0.0247 0.0264 
 [0.0210] [0.0210] [0.0203] [0.0202] 
T3: Social norms 0.0209 0.0237 0.0318 0.0360* 
 [0.0210] [0.0210] [0.0203] [0.0202] 
Female  0.0319**  0.0529*** 
  [0.0153]  [0.0148] 
Age   -0.00184  -0.00295*** 
  [0.00113]  [0.00108] 
Ever Married  0.00265  0.00861 
  [0.0200]  [0.0192] 
Delay last year  0.264  0.187 
  [0.176]  [0.169] 
Ln(Total Revenue in 
2015)    0.0217**  0.0478*** 
  [0.0101]  [0.00971] 
Share of business 
income    -0.0246  0.0394 
  [0.0301]  [0.0289] 
Constant 0.436*** 0.328*** 0.630*** 0.586*** 
 [0.0149] [0.118] [0.0143] [0.113] 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,320 4,320 4,320 4,320 
Standard errors in brackets    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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In this paper, we applied two of the more successful behavioral interventions (commission and 
social norms messages) from previous tax experiments, along with a simple reminder message, 
in a pre-emptive intervention which was set up to reduce delinquency. We showed that 
behaviorally-informed tax communication can be effective in improving tax compliance, even 
when targeted towards individuals who are partially or fully self-employed, and who have been 
delaying in the submission of, or failing to submit, their returns in the past few years. The 
context is that of a newly independent country, Latvia, where the shadow economy has 
historically played a large role. The experiment shows that any portions of this shadow 
economy that are familiar to the tax authority can be targeted successfully with simple 
interventions. We found that, as in Guatemala (Kettle et al., 2016), the most successful message 
in Latvia was the harder toned message, which made salient the role of deliberate active choice 
in non-compliance. We found that simple reminder and social norms messages also increased 
timely submissions, but not significantly so. However, the study was underpowered to 
distinguish treatment heterogeneity, such as on those individuals who have a higher proportion 
of own income.  
 
  (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 
Days to 
Submission Submitted by deadline Submitted 
        
T1: Simple Reminder -1.717   
 [2.007]   
T2: Commission -1.089   
 [1.986]   
T3: Social norms -2.816   
 [2.006]   
Female  0.0354** 0.0566*** 
  [0.0152] [0.0146] 
Age   0.000498 -0.000284 
  [0.000588] [0.000565] 
Ever Married  -0.00471 0.0123 
  [0.0193] [0.0186] 
Delay last year  0.184*** 0.140*** 
  [0.0152] [0.0146] 
Ln(Total Revenue in 
2015)  0.0170*** 0.0490*** 
  [0.00598] [0.00574] 
Share of business 
income    -0.0245 0.0568*** 
  [0.0204] [0.0196] 
Fixed Effects Yes No No 
Observations 1,974 4,320 4,320 
Standard errors in brackets    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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The results show promise for future research. First, we believe there is a high demand for 
policy-relevant experimentation in Latvia and similar countries, where tax authorities are 
actively looking for policy tools to help them to reduce the size of the shadow economy, and 
strongly encourage such collaborations.  Finally, the differential impact of such interventions 
on the different groups that comprise the shadow economies could be better understood by 
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AID Submitting Discipline 
1 High 
Under 30 
years Under 10 000 EUR AID submission delay for last taxation period 
2 High 
Under 30 




10 000 EUR - 100 




10 000 EUR - 100 
000 EUR AID submission delay for last 2-3 years 
5 High 
31-50 
years Under 10 000 EUR AID submission delay for last taxation period 
6 High 
31-50 




10 000 EUR - 100 




10 000 EUR - 100 
000 EUR AID submission delay for last 2-3 years 
9 High 
Over 51 
years Under 10 000 EUR AID submission delay for last taxation period 
10 High 
Over 51 




10 000 EUR - 100 




10 000 EUR - 100 
000 EUR AID submission delay for last 2-3 years 
13 Low 
Under 30 
years Under 10 000 EUR AID submission delay for last taxation period 
14 Low 
Under 30 




10 000 EUR - 100 




10 000 EUR - 100 
000 EUR AID submission delay for last 2-3 years 
17 Low 
31-50 
years Under 10 000 EUR AID submission delay for last taxation period 
18 Low 
31-50 




10 000 EUR - 100 




10 000 EUR - 100 
000 EUR AID submission delay for last 2-3 years 
21 Low 
Over 51 
years Under 10 000 EUR AID submission delay for last taxation period 
22 Low 
Over 51 




10 000 EUR - 100 




10 000 EUR - 100 
000 EUR AID submission delay for last 2-3 years 
25   Over 100 000 EUR   
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Submission of AID by month
Reminder Commission SocialNorms Control
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Female 0.592 0.555 0.550 0.553 0.082 0.051 0.068 0.829 0.931 0.897 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)       
ever_married 0.745 0.718 0.763 0.732 0.160 0.318 0.494 0.016 0.470 0.092 
  (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)       
age_years 47.082 47.004 47.145 46.847 0.901 0.919 0.707 0.820 0.804 0.628 
  (0.442) (0.450) (0.430) (0.440)       
delay_last_yr 0.583 0.581 0.581 0.582 0.931 0.931 0.965 1.000 0.965 0.965 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)       
Total revenue in 
2015 13646.759 12826.767 13241.847 13593.938 0.497 0.757 0.966 0.675 0.378 0.727 
  (1047.177) (599.683) (788.127) (630.610)       
dependence_high 0.236 0.234 0.236 0.237 0.919 1.000 0.960 0.919 0.879 0.960 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)       
N 1081 1081 1081 1081             
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Submitted by deadline Submitted by deadline Submitted Submitted 
T1: Simple Reminder 1.106 1.106 0.973 0.973 
 (0.0979) (0.0982) (0.0884) (0.0889) 
T2: Commission 1.188* 1.195** 1.119 1.127 
 (0.105) (0.106) (0.102) (0.104) 
T3: Social norms 1.093 1.106 1.156 1.180* 
 (0.0967) (0.0983) (0.106) (0.109) 
Female  1.145**  1.273*** 
  (0.0742)  (0.0856) 
Age   0.992  0.987*** 
  (0.00472)  (0.00490) 
Ever Married  1.011  1.039 
  (0.0854)  (0.0905) 
Ln(Total Revenue in 
2015)  1.096**  1.235*** 
  (0.0469)  (0.0542) 
Delay last year  2.953  2.516 
  (2.200)  (2.029) 
Share of business 
income    0.903  1.201 
  (0.114)  (0.157) 
Strata Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,320 4,320 4,320 4,320 
Standard errors in brackets    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table  A4: Submission by deadline heterogeneity by gender 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 










Group Female Male Female Male 
     
T1: Simple Reminder 0.0118 0.0362 0.0123 0.0372 
 [0.0281] [0.0319] [0.0281] [0.0320] 
T2: Commission 0.0335 0.0504 0.0343 0.0517* 
 [0.0285] [0.0312] [0.0285] [0.0312] 
T3: Social norms 0.0301 0.0124 0.0304 0.0148 
 [0.0286] [0.0312] [0.0286] [0.0312] 
Age    -0.00314** -7.61e-05 
   [0.00150] [0.00173] 
Ever Married   0.00233 -0.00495 
   [0.0271] [0.0303] 
Delay last year    1.046** 0.114 
   [0.450] [0.190] 
Ln(Total Revenue in 
2015)   0.0188 0.0224 
   [0.0135] [0.0154] 
Share of business 
income     -0.0352 -0.0140 
   [0.0390] [0.0479] 
Constant 0.454*** 0.412*** -0.165 0.161 
Strata Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,431 1,889 2,431 1,889 
Standard errors in brackets    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Treatment 2: Commission  
Subject: Submit your Annual Income Declaration to avoid potential penalty 
Hello!  
We hereby inform you that any delay in the submission of the Annual Income Declaration 
(AID) this year will be considered an intentional and deliberate choice made by you, and a 
penalty as per the Administrative Violations code of Latvia may be applied. 
We remind you that the Annual Income Declaration (AID) can be submitted in the 
Electronic Declaration System (EDS) during the period: 1st of March 2017 – 1st of June 
2017. 
A brief guide on how to submit the AID in the EDS is available here (link provided). 
In case of questions, please contact the Chief Tax Inspector Gunta Kazāka (phone number) 




Treatment 1: Simple Reminder 
Subject: Submit your Annual Income Declaration 
Hello!   
We remind you that the Annual Income Declaration (AID) can be submitted in the 
Electronic Declaration System (EDS) during the period: 1st of March 2017 – 1st of June 
2017.  
A brief guide on how to submit the AID in the EDS is available here (link provided). 
In case of questions, please contact the Chief Tax Inspector Dace Liepiņa (phone number). 
Thank you!  
 




Treatment 3: Social Norms 
Subject: Submit your Annual Income Declaration, just like your peers! 
Hello! 
The number of taxpayers who submit the Annual Income Declaration (AID) on time is 
increasing more and more.  
We remind you that the Annual Income Declaration (AID) can be submitted in the 
Electronic Declaration System (EDS) during the period: 1st of March 2017 – 1st of June 
2017. 
A brief guide on how to submit the AID in the EDS is available here (link provided). 
In case of questions, please contact the Chief Tax Inspector Elizabete Strade (phone 
number) 
Thank you! 
 
  
 
